Peter M. Haver

vex·a·tious

/vekˈsāSHəs/

1.causing vexation; troublesome; annoying:a vexatious situation.

2.Law. (of legal actions) instituted without sufficient grounds and serving only to cause annoyance to the defendant.

3. disorderly; confused; troubled.

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Abraham Lincoln Had It Right - “He who represents himself has a fool for a client”

Peter M. Haver, Appellant, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, Appellee, 444 F.3d 656 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

The first time we could find an instance where Mr. Haver represented himself was when he appealed the decision from the IRS claiming he was relieved of all obligations to pay income tax in the US while he worked in Germany. This appears to be the first of many failed attempts of successful litigation where he represented himself.

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https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/444/656/546279/

"The question in this case is whether a Treaty between the United States and Germany relieved Haver of all obligations to pay income tax to the U.S. for the time when he was in Germany. Because Haver's German tax payments exceeded his tax liability under U.S. law, he argues that the Treaty relieves him of any obligation to the U.S. Treasury. The Government, in turn, relies on 26 U.S.C. § 59(a) (2) (A) (2000), which provides that foreign tax credits may only extinguish up to 90% of a U.S. citizen's minimum tax burden. Haver claims that the statute and the Treaty are inconsistent, and that the Treaty should control because it was ratified subsequent to the statute's promulgation. The Government insists that the Treaty and statute coexist harmoniously, because the Treaty explicitly contemplates modifying the foreign tax credit to conform to the "limitations of the law of the United States." The Tax Court rejected Haver's position, holding that the Treaty's reference to the limitations of U.S. law eliminates any potential conflict with the statute. Haver v. CIR, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1428 (2005). We affirm the judgment of the Tax Court."

"Haver argues that the Government's position would allow the United States to deny the foreign tax credit to an unlimited extent, and thus effectively eviscerate the benefits of Article 23(1). Whether or not a more substantial AMT would conflict with the Treaty is a question that we need not answer here. As we have explained, § 59(a) was in place when the Treaty was adopted, so the parties to the Treaty had reason to know that the United States surely would impose a 10% minimum tax. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to decide what more might have been contemplated by the provision in Article 23(1) that conditions the tax credit on limitations of U.S. law "as it may be amended from time to time without changing the general principles" of the Treaty. Nor need we ponder whether the United States may effectively abrogate the Treaty by enacting legislation that cannot be reconciled with the Treaty.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Tax Court is affirmed."